Many of you may be familiar with what is today called the “Gaia hypothesis.” It consists in the thesis that the earth is a super-organism that exhibits specific properties of life: It regulates its own temperature, “excretes” waste, combats poisonous “infections,” and the like. In a word, it maintains homoeostasis. The hypothesis has supposedly been established by using a scientific method: the proposal of a hypothesis putatively based on observation and the reasonable explanation of the data. It was offered ostensibly (...) as the only viable explanation for a vast host of natural phenomena, of which the actual processes and mechanics are not truly understood. I will note just a few of these. (shrink)

In the section called “Observation of Nature” in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel considers and criticizes a particular form of methodology which seeks final purposes by analogy. Through this methodology what is essential for thought is the recognition and demarcation of differentiae, which are imputed to natural objects as qualities by which things maintain their distinct and separate character - what Hegel calls their “being-for-self.” By these differentiae, then, the objects are categorized into types, or “natural kinds,” which, in turn, (...) are interpreted by natural philosophers according to a projected teleological system. Hegel’s critique is not aimed primarily at the categorization of objects, but at the method of interpretation used to characterize these categories as purposeful. In particular, Hegel is not criticizing the use of analogy as discussed in the biological writings of Aristotle, but the use of analogy by the transcendental idealists, especially Kant, who employs this method in the Critique of Judgment. (shrink)

This paper considers Hegel’s treatment of the dispute between modern philosophy and faith in his Phenomenology of Spirit. The paper shows that Hegel is concerned with this dispute as part of his systematic program to advance the true philosophical concept of self and world, but, by so doing, he supports ahumanistic reconciliation between Christianity and the secular values of the Enlightenment. The paper contains extensive discussions of Hegel’s views on the French philosophes, and it shows how he used their writings (...) in his criticism of the popular notions within denominational religion. It also shows why Hegel did not fully support the philosophes’ assumptions, but, instead, he was willing to accept Christian notions of the incarnation and redemption. (shrink)

This work focuses on Hegel’s development concerning his philosophy of religion, beginning with his school days at Stuttgart, and ending with the publication of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The first half of the book is devoted to Hegel’s thought prior to the composition of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and the second half is devoted to a reading and interpretation of those chapters in the Phenomenology which concern religion. Unlike other interpreters of Hegel’s development, Crites is concerned principally with understanding Hegel’s (...) views and arguments on Christianity. He tells us, for instance, “I am concerned in this study with shedding light on the interpretation of Christianity in the works of the mature Hegel”. By “mature” he means Hegel’s Jena writings; there is only passing discussion of the post-Jena writings. For those scholars of Hegel who are interested in a solid introduction to Hegel’s religious thinking during his early period, this is an important volume. The chapters on the Bern and Frankfurt periods are especially enlightening. Crites does an excellent job especially in chapter 2, “The Problem of the Positivity of the Gospel in Hegel’s Early Writings,” and I found his discussion on the difference in Hegel’s thought between Folk Religion and Private Religion very insightful. (shrink)

This study concerns the role of reflective judgment in both aesthetical appreciation and one’s self-understanding in relation to an unfamiliar other. Pillow’s thesis is that “Sublime reflection can provide … a model for a kind of interpretive response to the uncanny Other ‘outside’ our conceptual grasp. It thereby advances our sense-making pursuits even while eschewing unified, conceptual determination”. His principal focus is on Kant’s development of sublime judgment in the third Critique, where this form of reflective judgment becomes central to (...) Pillow’s greater theme: “I privilege sublime reflection in particular because it best models our interpretative search for meanings in things … furthermore, this reflection acknowledges the constitutive limitations of context-dependent understanding, its incapacity to determine fully the sense-making wholes it reaches to comprehend”. Hegel is drawn into the study ostensibly for two reasons. First, he has a more extensive, and determinate, idea of the content of aesthetical appreciation, whereas Kant adheres to a formalistic notion; second, Hegel is the foil for Pillow’s postmodern approach to the significance of reflective understanding. Since Hegel’s Aesthetics presents “the content of an art work … [in] a single fixed theme wholly available to conceptual analysis,” it stands opposed to Pillow’s view that the relation between the self-understanding subject and the other must remain “open” and foreign. Between and above Kant and Hegel floats Lyotard whose deconstructionist work on practical reason forms the impetus in Pillow’s study. (shrink)